potential presidential coattail effects. Are Senate campaigns, like contests for the House and offices of lesser salience, subject to the influence of presidential coattails? Or are they free of coattail effects because of their greater public salience, financing, and visibility and the prominence of the candidates? While significant presidential coattails have been found in House and state legislative elections (J. Campbell 1986a Campbell , 1986b Born 1984; Calvert and Ferejohn 1983) , research on presidential coattails in Senate elections has been relatively meager. Key (1958, 592-99) found that parties were able to hold or win a greater share of seats in states in which the presidential candidate ran well. Hinckley (1970) , examining Senate contests in 34 competitive states from 1956 to 1966, found that deviations of the presidential and Senate votes from the states' simulated base party vote were positively correlated (r = .70). Deviations from the base vote were examined as a rough control for state partisanship. More recently, Stewart (1987) examined a general model of Senate voting, considering the votedrawing powers or turnout effects of incumbents and challengers separately. He found that presidential coattails significantly affected the numbers of voters turning out to vote for both incumbents and challengers. The most comprehensive study of Senate elections to date (Abramowitz 1988), however, did not explicitly specify any presidential coattail effects.' Of course, it is possible that presidential coattails do not extend to Senate candidates. While evidence of presidential coattail effects have been found below the level of Senate elections, these coattail effects may have diminished somewhat in recent years (Campbell 1986b; Ferejohn and Calvert 1984 The comparative campaign spending advantage is specified as having both an additive and an interactive effect. As Abramowitz (1988, 393), Jacobson (1978, 41) , and others have shown, campaign finances are more important to challengers than to incumbents, since challengers must compensate for many advantages (e.g., voter recognition) that incumbents enjoy by virtue of having previously sought, won, and served in office. Given the coding of Democratic incumbents (1), the interaction of incumbency status and the campaign spending advantage index is expected to have a negative effect on the Democratic Senate vote.
If candidates face serious opposition in obtaining their party's nomination, they may be weakened in their general election bid. Divisive primary battles may deplete resources that would have otherwise been available for the general election campaign; create negative impressions about the eventual nominee (perhaps given greater credence since the attacks come from within the nominee's own party); and leave many of the party identifiers of the eventual nominee's party disappointed that their first choice failed to win the nomination (Southwell 1986 
Common Causes
While presidential coattails link the Senate and presidential votes, the association appears to be more of a result of common cause. Recall that the bivariate estimate of presidential vote's association with the Senate coattails was .59 (r = .37) while the multivariate nonrecursive estimate of its actual effect is just .16 (beta = .10). This suggests that presidential coattails account for about one-quarter (27%) of the overall association between the two votes. Factors affecting both the presidential and Senate votes must account for the remaining association between the presidential and senatorial votes. The effects of these common causes can be assessed by the estimated paths of the full model presented in Figure 1 .
Of these common causes, a common partisan electorate is most responsible for much of the association between the presidential and Senate votes beyond coattails. The general ideological composition of a state is related to the presidential vote but is only weakly related to the Senate vote. Ehrenhalt 1983 Ehrenhalt , 1985 Ehrenhalt , 1987 8. Coattail effects are qualified by seem to because they are point estimates around which one may want to draw confidence intervals. Also, a second baseline of the normal vote was considered. However, since the effects of state partisanship or its normal vote have been included in the general model (Figure 1) , using the normal vote as a baseline would seem to be controlling twice its effects.
9. The effect of the campaign spending advantage on the Senate vote may be a bit misleading. Undoubtedly, a financial advantage of one candidate over his opponent, if well exploited, yields some votes for the better financed candidate. However, some part of the effects attributed to the campaign spending advantage reflect the comparative qualities of the candidates themselves rather than the impact of money per se (Green and Krasno 1988, 889) .
10. The unstandardized direct and indirect effects of the prior Senate vote on the subsequent vote is about .65. Ibis indicates that 65% of the prior vote is carried over to the next election. Of course, this effect may be different for votes received on the basis of presidential coattails rather than partisanship, ideology, and the voters' past assessment of the incumbent. We might expect greater attrition of coattail votes. Also, presidential home state advantage and incumbency effects on the presidential vote were specified in Figure 1 ; but since neither influenced the Senate vote, they are not shown. Both were significant,
